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The main thrust of this paper will be centered around
the issue of whether the Navy should restructure the Opera-
tional Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR) along the lines
of the Army's and Air Force's independent test agencies. The
paper begins v/ith an overview of the weapon system acquisi-
tion process. It then proceeds to demonstrate how test and
evaluation (T&E) fits into the acquisition process. Finallyi
a description and evaluation of the each of the service's
independent test agencies are presented.
The researcher suggests that the perceived problems are
not caused by OPTEVFOR's present structural arrangement, but
are the result of OPTEVFOR's philosophy. The final conclu-
sion is that OPTEVFOR should not change its existing struc-
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I. INTRODUCTION
Weapon system acquisition, the development and procure-
ment of military systems, is a matter of widespread and
increasing concern. Government Reports, Congressional
hearings, as well as articles in the press, have suggested
that the acquisition process is not working as well as it
should. A few examples of these shortcomings are: that
development fails to produce a satisfactory working design,
that major systems incur large cost overruns, and that parts
are over priced.
Testing of new weapon systems is one of the Department
of Defense's (DOD) key controls in the process of acquiring
these complex and expensive systems. Adequate test and
evaluation (T&E) of these weapon systems is of paramount
importance to ensure maximum return for the dollars spent
to procure the systems.
Significant improvements have been accomplished in the
test and evaluation portion of the acquisition process. In
earlier years, test and evaluation was often accomplished
when or where time allowed and usually by personnel who were
not trained in the techniques of testing. After the July
1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Reports, test and evaluation
policies were significantly altered. Separate independent
test agencies were established within each service. These
agencies, although organized differently, had one thing in
common, each maintained its testing independent from the
developer, reporting directly to its own service
headquarters. These independent agencies perform v;hat is
commonly called Operational Test and Evaluation fOT&E). They
check to see if and how well the system will function in an
operational environment.
How Operational Test and Evaluation is being implemented
has been one of the central issues identified in numerous
committees, commissions and reports on weaknesses in weapon
system acquisition. The issues addressed in these studies
have been consistently repeated. A report done in February
1977 by the Defense Science Board identified one
significant shortcoming in OT&E. The report stated that it
is very important for all participants in the acquisition
process to participate throughout the entire acquisition
process. At the time of this report this interaction between
the developer and service OT&E organizations did not exist.
[Ref. 1: p. 7]
Directives and instructions have been issued which
should have corrected some of the major OT&E problems. These
instructions however, have not been effectively implemented
in the Mavy, and this has resulted in the Navy's OT&E
practices remaining essentially unchanged with little
interaction between the developer and the independent
operational test agency. This course of action has been one
of the reasons for an increase in the length of the
acquisition process, which in turn has increased the
overall costs of the process as well.
As a result of the Tlavy's reluctance for interaction, a
question has been asked about the present structure of the
Navy's independent operational test agency. This question is
should the Navy restructure its Operational Test and
Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR) along the lines of the Army and
the Air Force? Presently the Army and Air Force independent
oper'ational test agencies act as a manager, allowing the
user to do the actual operational testing. The flavy's
Operational Test and Evaluation Force on the other hand,
acts as a surrogate for the fleet (user) and does all the
Operational Test and Evaluation. It is felt by some, that
by restructuring, the user's inputs could be introduced into
the process on an earlier and continuous basis. The
contention is that the restructuring would also enormously
reduce the size and cost of OPTEVFOR and additionally would
provide a trained first fleet unit at the end of the
Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL). An additional potential
benefit espoused would be an earlier Initial Operational
Capability (IOC). [Ref. 2]
The main thrust of this thesis will center around the
issue of whether the Navy should restructure OPTEVFOR along
the lines of the Army and Air Force. However, before this
issue can be properly addressed, a foundation has to be
laid. This foundation will consist of an overview of the
weapon system acquisition process, how TdE fits into the
acquisition process, and finally a description and
evaluation of each of the service's independent test
aRiencies.
II. DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROCESS
The issue of whether to restructure the Navy's Opera-
tional Test and Evaluation Force can not be properly
addressed without a basic understanding of the DoD's weapon
system acquisition process and how the Service's T&E program
fits into the overall acquisition scheme.
The present method of managing the weapons systems ac-
quisition process in the DoD, emerged as a result of a study
by the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (BRDP) done in
1970. As a result of recommendations of the BRDP, the
Department of Defense Directive 5000.1 was promulgated and
released in 1971. The next item to be released in this
evolution was the issuance of Office of Management and
Budget (0MB) Circular A-109, which was released in 1976. The
policies and guidelines in these documents form the basis
for all the subsequent directives and instructions regulat-
ing the acquisition of weapon systems. These directives and
instructions enable the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), who
is aided by the Joint Requirements and Management Board
(JRMB), formerly called the Defense System Acquisition
Review Council (DSARC), to guide and control the development
and production of major weapon systems through a series of
acquisition phases, milestone reviews, and decision points.
























Figure 1 Acquisition Phases and Milestone;
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It is the Secretary of Defense who makes the decision as
to which new systems will be designated a major system. The
decision to designate any system as major is based upon:
a. Development risk, urgency of need* or other items of
interest to the SECDEF.
b. Joint acquisition of a system by the DOD and repre-
sentatives of another nation, or by two or more DOD
Components
.
c. The estimated requirement for the system's research,
development. T&E, procurement (production) and opera-
tion and support resources. A Justification for Major
System New Start (JMSNS) is required for all acquisi-
tions for which the DOD Component estimates cost to
exceed s^200 million (FY80 dollars) in RDT&E funds or
$1 Billion (FY80 dollars) in procurement (production)
funds, or both.
d. Significant congressional interest .[ Ref . U : pp. 5-6]
It should be noted that all weapon systems acquisitions
go through a similar process to the one outlined here for
major systems. The only difference is that decisions are
made at lower levels within the Services.
There are four distinct phases and milestones in the
system acquisition process. The actual acquisition of a
new system begins with either a decision to establish new
capabilities in response to a technologically feasible op-
portunity, an identified deficiency in an existing
capability, a significant opportunity to reduce the DoD cost
of ownership, or in response to a change in the national
defense policy [Ref 4: pp. 3-4]. This part of the process is
called Milestone 0.
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By preparing a Justification for Major System Mew Start
(JMSNS), the Services document the need for the new system
and submit it into the Planning. Programming, and Budget
System (PPBS) process along with the Service's Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) for the year in which the funds
are requested. The Secretary of Defense may than sanction
the JMSNS in the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). This
action, designated Milestone 0, authorizes the Service to
initiate the program when funds are available and moves the
program into the next acquisition phase which is called
Concept Exploration (CE).
In the Concept Exploration phase, several contracts are
awarded to industry to identify and investigate alternative
system design concepts that will satisfy the mission need.
At the conclusion of this phase, the Program Manager (PM)
makes his/her recommendation for those concepts which have
the potential for further development and evaluation and
should be carried forward into the next phase of the ac-
quisition process which is called the Demonstration and
Validation (DaV) phase. This recommendation is documented in
the System Concept Paper (SCP).
The SCP is submitted to the Joint Requirements and
Management Board (JRMB) and then forwarded, if approved, to
the SECDEF. The SECDEF uses the SCP to make the Milestone I
decision . The authority to proceed is provided in the
13
Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum (SDDM). Approval
signifies a validation of the requirement and is authoriza-
tion to proceed with uhe D^V phase with the most promising
concepts [Ref 4: p. 4].
An additional document developed during the CE phase,
is the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). The TEMP is a
short, concise master plan for T&E. Its purpose is to iden-
tify all required T&E resourcesM facilitate long-range plan-
ning, programming, and budgeting including that of adequate
numbers of test hardware items and specialized major range
and test facilities^ ensure accomplishment of adequate T&EM
and eliminiate redundant testing. The TEMP forms the basic
contract between the Development Agency (DA) which is
responsible for the Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
and the independent test agency, who is responsible for the
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). I7hile the initial
version of the TEMP, which is required at Milestone I, will
lack many specifics, through a continuous revision process
the TEI'IP will develop the necessary detail. [Ref. 3:p. 3-19]
A positive Milestone I decision allows the system to
enter the Demonstration and Validation phase. The purpose of
this phase is to further develop and validate the alterna-
tive concepts to determine which concept(s) should progress
into the Full Scale Development (FSD) phase [Ref. 3: p. 1-15].
This phase involves demonstration of the technology to be
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used in the system or critical subsystems to verify perfor-
mance and the potential suitability of the concept to fill
the mission need. At this point, scientific and technologi-
cal development is required to bring the concept to its
fruition .
It is during the D&V phase that both DTiE and OT&E begin
with the test results being used to support the Milestone II
decision. Identifying critical issues and areas of risk
that have been addressed by test and evaluation, the Deci-
sion Coordinating Paper (DCP)/ Integrated Program Summary
(IPS) is prepared by the Program Manager. The DCP/IPS
provides the test objectives and measures of effectiveness
related to the satisfaction of mission need and resource
requirements that apply to the test activity. The PM submits
the document through the JRMB to the SECDEF for the
Milestone II decision. SECDEF approval authorizes the
program to proceed into the Full Scale Development phase
(FSD)
.
The purpose of the FSD phase is to produce a fully
tested, documented, and production-engineered design of the
selected concept [Ref. 3: p. 1-151. This phase is divided
into three subphases: engineering, prototype, and pilot-
production/ transition to production. It is during this part
of the acquisition cycle that two major evaluations take
place. The first is the technical evaluation (TECHEVAL), the
15
purpose of which is to identify technical deficiencies and
determine whether the design meets technical specifications
and requirements [Ref. 5: p. 2]. This evaluation is a very
important facet of development testing, for if the system
passes the TECHEVAL it goes on to the next major evaluation,
which is called Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL). Given the
data from the TECHEVAL, OPEVAL proceeds to test the system
for demonstration of operational effectiveness and opera-
tional suitability, in addition to verification of fixes for
problems discovered in the TECHEVAL [Ref. 5: p. 4], These
formal evaluations are performed in order to certify readi-
ness for the production phase.
The final milestone decision point, Milestone III, is
to decide whether or not the system is to enter into produc-
tion and deployment. The PM documents the results of the
FSD phase, including testing, and plans for future testing
are assessed again. The PM then sends his recommendations in
an updated DCP/IPS through the JRMB to the SECDEF for his
decision. Normally, however, the Secretary of Defense
delegates the Milestone III decision to the Secretary of the
branch of the Service that is responsible for the system.
For less than major systems, this decision in some cases is
delegated to the lowest level in the organization at which
overall view of the program rests. This is the point were
test results play their most critical role because they
16
assist the decision maker in his decision whether to approve
or deny production.
An affirmative Milestone III decision allows the
system to enter the Production and Deployment Phase. One or
more contractors are awarded a production contract for
either low- rate or full rate production. Even after the
system is being producedi testing does not stop. The syster.i
is assessed in new environments, in different platform
applications, in new tactical applications, or against new
threats .
Besides the aforementioned fixed milestones, additional
program reviews can be held at any point in the program when
major problems arise. Host of the information at the reviews
comes from the test and evaluation results and is used to
assess the programs progress and its likely success
[Ref 6: p. 88]. Depending on the findings, a program may
advance to the next phase, be canceled or just held at its
present phase.
In summation, the acquisition process that is presented
here is a very simplistic overview. This process, though
conceptually simple, in fact is extremely detailed in its
requirements. Test and evaluation is an essential player in
the Department of Defense's acquisition process, in that




III. WHAT IS TEST AND EVALUATION ?
Test and evaluation is a fundamental and integral part
of the acquisition process. Although the terms "test" and
"evaluation" are used jointly, they do represent two dis-
tinct and unique functions. One definition of TEST is " a
critical examination, observation or evaluation; a trial or
group of trials" [Ref. 7:p. 2]. Evaluation, on the other
hand concerns the review and analysis of data produced
during testing or use of the item.
The Department of Defense is generally concerned with
three types of test and evaluation: Development Test and
Evaluation (DT&E), Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E),
and Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E)
[Ref. 8: p. 2]. Figure 2 is a summary overview of the acquisi-
tion process, and it illustrates where these three types
of test and evaluation fit into the acquisition process
[Ref. 3: p. 1-18].
A. DEVELOPMENT TEST AND EVALUATION (DT&E)
DT&E is that test and evaluation conducted to
demonstrate that the engineering design and development
process is complete, the design risks have been minimized,
the system will meet the specifications, and to estimate the
system's military utility when introduced [Ref. 9: p. 7-8].
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Figure 2. Summary Overview of the Acquisition Process
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monitored, by the Developing Agency (DA) of the Military
Departments or other Defense Agencies, with the results
being reported to the responsible Military Service Chief.
DT&E is required for all acquisition programs. It can
be broken down into three major phases: DT-I, DT-II, and
DT-III. The specific objectives of each phase are developed
by the DA and are published in the Test and Evaluation
Master Plan (TEMP).
DT-I is conducted during the Demonstration and Valida-
tion Phase to support the Milestone II decision. Its prin-
cipal purpose is to demonstrate that all technical risks
have been identified and that solutions to the risks are in
hand [Ref. 9:p. 7-8].
Conducted during the Full Scale Development Phase. DT-II
is used to support the production and deployment (Milestone
III) decision. DT-II demonstrates that the design meets its
specifications in performance, compatibility, suppor-
tability. survivability, safety, and human factors [Ref. 9:
p. 7-9].
The Technical Evaluation (TECHEVAL) is the final phase
of DT-II. It is conducted to determine whether or not a
system is functioning in a technically acceptable manner,
whether it meets technical and design performance specifica-
tions, and to determine if it is ready for the Operational
Evaluation (OPEVAL). The Developing Agency (DA) has the
20
primary responsibility for planning the test program and oo-
taining their results. After the TECHEVAL, the DA certifies
that the system is ready for the Operational Evaluation
(OPEVAL). However, OPEVAL may not commence until the
Secretary and the independent test agency of the concerned
branch of the service accepts the DA ' s certification of
readiness for OPEVAL, [Ref. 9: p. 7-9]
The final phase of DT&E is DT-III. It is conducted after
the production and deployment decision (Milestone III). DT--
III is used to verify the correction of design deficiencies
found during TECHEVAL or OPEVAL, and that any improvements
that were made to the system are effective.
3. OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION (OT&E)
Operational Test and Evaluation is the test and evalua-
tion conducted by an independent agency to determine the
prospective system's military utility, operational effec-
tiveness (including compatibility, interoperability,
reliability, and maintainability), and logistic and training
requirements [Ref. 9: p. 7-91. Since OT&E is conducted under
as near to realistic operating conditions as possible,
needed modifications to the system do become apparent during
this process. The operating personnel, as well as required
support facilities, are typical of those expected to operate
and maintain the system when it is deployed.
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OT&S can be broken down into two categories: Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation (lOT&E), which is all OTdiE
conducted prior to the producLion and deployment decision,
and Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E), which
is all 0T2cE which is conducted after the production and
deployment decision. 0T;2cE can also be divided into four
phases (two in lOT&E and two in FOT&E).
OT-I is the first phase of Initial Operational Test
and Evaluation (lOT^E), and is conducted during the
Demonstration and Validation Phase to support the full-scale
development decision (Milestone II). Its objectives are to
provide an early assessment as to whether or not. based on
the system's effectiveness, the project/program should con-
tinue on its development [Ref. 9: p. 7-9],
The other phase of lOT&E is called OT-II, and is con-
ducted during the Full-Scale Development Phase. The OPEVAL
is the culmination of OT-II. The objectives of OT-II are the
demonstration of the achievement of program objectives for
operational effectiveness and of operational suitability.
The first phase of Follow-on Operational Test and
Evaluation (FOT&E) is called OT-III, and is conducted after
the production and deployment decision. This testing is done
before production systems are available. Normally it is
done using the same preproduc t ion system that was used in
22
the OPEVAL. The specific objectives of OT-III include: test-
ing of fixes or corrections that were incorporated, comple-
tion of any deferred or incomplete Initial Operational Test
and Evaluation (lOT&E), and evaluation of any new tactics
development
.
OT-IV is the second phase of FOTgcE, and it is conducted
on the production system. One of the initial objectives of
OT-IV is the demonstration of the achievement of program ob-
jectives for production system operational effectiveness and
operational suitability, especially reliability, main-
tainability and logistic supportabili ty . Additional objec-
tives are OT&E of the system in new environments, in new
applications, or against new threats.
C. PRODUCTION ACCEPTANCE TEST AND EVALUATION (PATiE)
Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation is conducted
upon production items to ensure that the items procured meet
the specifications of the procurement contract. Successful
completion constitutes the recognition that the item
fulfills the requirement for which it was produced. PAT<S:E is
the responsibility of the Developing Agency and begins in
the transition to production section of tne Full- Scale
Development Phase and continues through the Production and
Deployment Phase [Ref. 9: p. 7-9].
The single most important message that comes out of the
test and evaluation evolution is that any new acquisition
23
program must be capable of meeting or exceeding the real
v;orld goals expected of it in the actual or closely
simulated operational environment prior to any major
pr'oduction commitment. The information obtained by T & E is
used to give a better understanding of the system's
capabilities, to identify shortcomings, to develop
improvements, and to assist in designing tiie system's
future replacements. Additionally, an important facet of tiie
program is to verify the ability to support and maintain the
system and to develop requirements for training personnel in
the operation of the system.
24
IV. THE SERVICES' INDEPENDENT TEST AGENCIES
FOR OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
Having established a base from which to work, each in-
dividual service will be reviewed to see how they are
structured to handle the requirement for independent test
and evaluation. However, before this is undertaken, the
issue of what prompted the drive for the independent test
agencies will be presented.
During the period prior to the President's Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel Report (released on 1 July 1970), defense sys-
tem planners and developers received little attention from
Congress on the methods they used to develop and test the
new systems. At that time, most of the controversy sur-
rounded the actual need for the weapon system and the cost
of placing the weapon system into the defense inventory. The
concern of whether the weapon system could in fact perform
to the designated specifications or was actually ready for
production was very small outside the Department of Defense.
Most of this lack of concern can be attributed to a general
feeling of satisfaction within the Congress that the govern-
ment research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
side had been very successful since the United States was
winning the intercontinental ballistic missile and space
race. It was during this period in time that the U.S. placed
a man on the Moon. Another factor that kept the Congress's
25
attention was the war in Vietnam. VJith the change of Presi-
dents and a change in attitudes toward economic conditions
and domestic issues, the Congress intensified its scrutiny
of Defense expenditures, in particular the area of major
weapon system acquisition. It was this intensification by
the Congress that brought about the dramatic change in the
military services' test and evaluation policies.
The President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (BRDP) was one
of tlie major driving forces behind the one hundred and
eighty degree change in attitudes. In the BRDP report the
Department of Defense's operational test and evaluation
practices were specifically addressed as a significant
problem area. The following excerpt points out the concern
of the panel
:
There has been an increasing desire, particularly
at the OSD level, to use data from OT&E to assist
in the decision-making process. Unquestionably it
would be extremely useful to replace or support
critical assumptions and educated guesses with
quantitative data obtained from realistic and relevant
operational testing.
Unfortunately, it has been almost impossible to
obtain results which are directly applicable to the
decision or useful for analysis. Often, test data do
not exist. I7hen they do. they frequently are derived
from tests which were poorly designed or conducted
under insufficiently controlled conditions to permit
valid comparisons. It is especially difficult to
obtain test data in time to assist in decision-making.
Significant changes are essential if OTiS is to real-
ize its potential for contributing to im.portant deci-
sions, particularly where the tests and the decisions
must cross Service lines. [Ref. 10: p. 59]
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Secretary Packard, then the Deputy Secretary of Defence,
was the driving force within the DeparT::.]ent of Defense for
changing the test and evaluations policies. He personally
sent a series of memoranda to the Services in which he
requested that the Services arrange for OT^E to be managed
and conducted by an independent agency separate from the
developing command and which reported their results directly
to the Chief of the Service.
The formal directive came in the form of two Department
of Defense Directives (DODDs). The first v;as Department of
Defense Directive 5000.1, which officially tied OTiE with
the Joint Requirements and Management Board (JRM3), then
called DSARC, PJilestone III decision point.
Test and evaluation shall commence as early as pos-
sible. A determination of operational suitability,
including logistic support requirements, will be made
prior to large scale production commitments, making use
of the most realistic environment possible and the best
representation of the future operational system avail-
able. The results of this operational testing will be
evaluated and presented to the DSARC at the time of the
production decision. [Ref. 11: para. HI, C.I]
The second directive was DODD 5000.3, which provided ad-
ditional and more specific test and evaluation policy
guidance than that of DODD 5000.1.
In each DOD component there will be one major
agency separate and distinct from the developing/
procuring command and from the using command which will
be responsible for OT&E and which will:
a. Report the results of its independent test
and evaluation directly to the Military
Service Chief or Defense Agency Director.
27
c .
Recommend directly to its Military Service
Chief or Defense Agency Director the ac-
complishment of adequate OT&E.
Insure that the OT>iE is effectively planned
and conducted [Ref.128: para. IV, C.I].
The stage had now been set with the official Office of
the Secretary of Defense direction for the formation of an
independent testing agency v;ithin each service.
The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report should be con-
sidered the catalyst* v;hich resulted in a major change in
how the Services viewed their test and evaluations ac-
tivities. The most notable change came in the area of OT(?cE.
An examination of how each branch of the service incor-
porated this new philosophy follows.
A. ARMY
During the period 1962-1971, the testing of systems and
equipment under development and in-process of acquisition by
the Army was accomplished almost totally within the Army
Material Command (AI'IC). The Army Material Command assigned
the test responsibilities to the Commanding General, United
States Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM).
As the Army's principal material testing organization,
the Test and Evaluation Command was assigned the basic mis-
sion of providing the decision makers with unbiased indepen-
dent appraisals of Army material. The Army chartered the
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TECOM to reduce the time frame between design and production
and to eliminate duplication of effort through integrated
testing and better coordination.
To accomplish what the charter mandated, TECOM employed
both engineering tests and service tests. Engineering tests
were conducted to determine if the system really met the
material need. Service tests examined the human inter' face
with the system. These tests determined the equipment's
suitability for the Army's use and for release to produc-
tion. Actual operational units were employed to conduct
tests in a tactical environment and in general possessed
many of the characteristics of present OT&E practices.
However, these tests were often conducted after the manage-
ment decision to produce the system in numbers and even
after the deployment for Army operational use.
Since the Test and Evaluation Corfimand was affiliated
with the Army's Material Command developers, a new and inde-
pendent command was necessary in order to meet the require-
ments of the Department of Defense Directive. As a result,
the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA) was estab-
lished on 25 September 1972 at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
Through their charter from the Secretary of the Army. OTEA
v/as given the management responsibility for major and non-
major systems. [Ref. 13: pp. C-1 - C-3]
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The Commanding General of OTEA reports to the Chief of
Staff of the Army. The mission and functions of OTEA are as-
signed by Array Regulation (AR) 10-4, "U.S. Army Operational
Test and Evaluation Agency". The mission of OTEA "is to
manage all user testing, operational testing (OT), force
development testing and experimentation (FDTE), and joint
user testing directed by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense" [Ref. 14: p. 2], The specific tasks which are as-
signed to OTEA are summarized as:
a. Plan, direct and evaluate the operational testing of
all major and selected non-major systems.
b. Coordinate the operational testing of other non-
major systems.
c. Manage major and coordinate non-major FDTE.
d. Coordinate Army participation in the planning and
execution of Joint OT&E.
e. Provide a strong focal point organization to keep
the Developing Agency (DA) and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) fully informed on the
Army's OT&E needs and accomplishments.
The original manning level of OTEA was set at 120 person-
nel, which included: 53 officers, 2 enlisted, and 65
civilians. In 1975, the strength was increased to 250 per-
sonnel with 125 officers, 20 enlisted, and 105 civilians.
Today, its strength is 256 personnel with 122 officers, 8
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enlisted, and 126 civilians [Ref. 15]. Figures 3 shov;s
OTEA's relationship within the Army's Test and Evaluation
organization. Figure M is the organizational chart for OTSA.
VJhen the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency receives
a system from AMC for T&E, it either appoints its ov/n test
director and team or tasks the Force Command (who is respon-
sible for the continental U.S. Army Divisions) along with
the Material Development and Readiness Couimand and/or the
Training Doctrine Command to perform the testing. This deci-
sion is made based upon the size and importance of the
program/system to be tested. OTEA's role when it retains a
system for testing is to furnish three to five of its per-
sonnel to fill key positions on the team such as the Deputy
Director for the systems OT, the Chief Analyst, the Chief
Data Collector, and the Chief Controller. TRADOC , repre-
senting the user, provides the appropriate assistants in the
areas of conceptual expertise. The remaining positions are
filled by the testing command. If the program/system OTaE is
tasked to an organization other than OTEA, OTEA mainly
evaluates the data generated by the testing command. OTEA
is currently directing/managing OT&E for 62 major and 250
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In their attempt to conform to the DOD requirement, the
Air Force initially tried to achieve independence in opera-
tional testing by placing the full OT&E responsibility on
the user Command. Even though this was a step in the right
direction, the Air Force's effort fell short of its mark and
was often subject to criticism. To correct this shortcoming,
the Air Force, in October of 157^. established its indepen-
dent test agency calling it the Air Force Operational Test
and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) at Kirkland Air Force Base,
N e w 1 1 exico. AFOTEC is a separate operating agency that
reports directly to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. In
addition to its headquarters at Kirkland. AFOTEC has four
additional permanently established detachments at Edwards
Air Force Base. California. Eglin Air Force Base. Florida,
Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and Kapaun Air Station, West
Germany. Along with these four permanent detachments there
are additional field test teams at various designated sites.
[Ref . 17: p. 1 ]
The center's headquarters and field teams include opera-
tional, technical, analytical and test specialists. The
field test teams conduct their test at the selected sites
and from the results prepare the formal reports. These field
teams are composed of personnel from the Air Force Test and
Evaluation Center along with personnel from the operating
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and support commands viho V'.'ill eventually receive and utilize
the systems in every day operation.
The Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center's
stated mission is "to rnana^re the Air Force operational test
and evaluation program anci assess the military utility and
operational effectiveness and suitabiJ. ity of major and
designed non-major systems" [Ref. 17: p.1]. The specific
tasks v;hich are assigned to AFOTEC are summarized as:
a. Design, direct, analyze, evaluate and report on




Designate the Deputy Test Director and provide (with
augmentation from major corimands) the OT&E team for
combined DTiE/I0T4E programs retained by AFOTEC.
c. Monitor all non-major system OT&E conducted by
the major commands ( e.g. TAC , SAC, MAC) through
review and approval of tests plans and review of
comments on the test reports.
d. Develop policy recommendations for Headquarters,
United States Air Force approval and subsequent im-
plementation by all major commands.
e. Act as spokesman to the Joint Requirement and
Management Board (JRMB) on matters pertaining to
OT&E.
f. Support Congressional requests for OTc:E information
on weapon systems for which procurement funds are
beingrequested. [Ref. 17: p.1]
Since becoming operational, the manning of AFOTEC has
increased from the initial authorization of 208, to the
present strength of 677. This manning level includes 477 of-
ficers, 90 enlisted, and 110 civilians. AFOTEC is
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additionally augmented by 2500 personnel from the previously
mentioned operating and support commands [Ref. 13] The
organization of AFOTEC is similar to that of the Army's
GTE A. Figure 5 shov;s the overall relationship of AFOT&E
within the Air Force, and Figure 6 is the organization chart
of AFOTEC.
Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center is
currently managing OT^^E for 55 major and designed non-major
pro.c^rams. In addition, the center is presently monitoring
240 operational test efforts being done by other major USAF
commands. [Ref. 19]
C. NAVY
The Navy had an easier time than its sister Services in
coming up with a test agency that was independent of the
developer, since the Navy already had one in existence. This
command is call the Operational Test and Evaluation Force
(OPTEVFOR) .
OPTEVFOR can trace its origin to the final months of
World 17 ar II. During the Okinawa campaign, the surface
forces of the Mavy came under a sustained concentrated
attack by Japanese kamikaze aircraft. These suicide attacks
took a great toll in ships and personnel, and a means to
deal with the threat was urgently required. In July of 1945,
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tasked with the developaient and evaluation of r.iethods to
combat such attacks. This uas the origin of the f.'avy's
independent test agency. [Ref. 13: pp.D-1 - D-3]
In the follov;ing years, changes were made to the na;ae of
the command and to the assigned mission and tasks. These
changes resulted in a wider scope of responsibilities and
expanded capabilities in test and evaluation. Additionally,
a similarly structured command was formed on the west coast
for the Pacific Fleet.
To achieve the desired independence which was suggested
in the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel report and required in the
DOD directives, OPTEVFOR had to make a shift in its
emphasis. This change in mission orientation was
accomplished in the period between late 1971 and middle
1972. VJhile the reorganization did not involve an
appreciable organizational restructuring or an increase in
manpower allocation, it did require a different and more
expensive mix of personnel. The Navy's "nands-on"
operational testing concept required operational officers
and highly skilled noncommissioned officers that were
familiar with the current missions, tactics, policies, and
procedures. [Ref. 13: pp. D-1 - D-3]
The Operational Test and Evaluation Force is now under
the direct command of the Chief of Naval Operations (CMO)
for the conduct of OT&E. The organizational relationship
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that OPTEVFOR has with the DOD/MAVY can be seen in Figure 7.
The command headquarters for OPTEVFOR is located at the
Norfolk (Virginia) !Javal Base. For the Pacific area of
operations, a separate staff under the Deputy COMOPTEVFOR is
located at the Naval Air Station. North Island. San Diego.
California. The function of the Deputy COMOPTEVFOR is to act
as the representive of OPTEVFOR in matters in the Pacific
area and. when directed, with west coast operational
commands (e.g. COMNAVAIRPAC , COMNAVSUFPAC )
.
The mission of OPTEVFOR is assigned by the CNO and is
"to operationally test and evaluate specific weapon systems.
ships, aircraft, and equipments, including procedures and
tactics, where required;- and. when directed by CNO, assist
development agencies in the accomplishment of necessary
Developmental Test and Evaluation" [Ref. 20: p. 1].
The specific tasks which are also assigned to COMOPTEVFOR by
the CNO are summarized as:
a. Function as an independent test agency for OT&E
under the command of the CNO.
b. Serve as principal advisor to the CNO for all
Department of the Navy OTocE matters.
c. Present results of OTdE to the JRMB at Milestone
III (production decision) review and to other reviews
as directed by the CtJO.
d. Conduct operational tests on weapon systems
includng ships and aircraft. Evaluate operational
effectiveness, suitability, and capability, reporting
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e. Assist development agencies in DT&E. including fleet
support, as required, reporting the results of such
assists and an assessment of the system tested.
f. Review and evaluate the T^E planning for new v;eapons
systems to address and resolve critical issues and
report the findings to the CNO [Ref. 20: p. 1].
The current authorized personnel strength of OPTEVFOR
is approximately 1U00. Its Norfolk Headquarters has 268
personnel, including 119 officers, 119 enlisted, and 30
civilians [Ref. 21]. This represents only about one-fifth of
the authorized positions in OPTEVFOR. The other personnel
are spread across the subordinate command (DEPCOMOPTEVFOR )
,
organic aircraft squadrons ( VX- 1 , VX-4 , VX-5 ) , and the
Sunnyvale detachment. Figure 3 shows the current
organizational arrangement of OPTEVFOR.
It is interesting to note that when OPTEVFOR does OT&E
on a ship or submarine it preforms the tests in a very
similiar manner to that of the Army or Air Force. OPTEVFOR
usually sends a detachment of their people to the
ship /submarine to direct the testing, but utilizes that
unit's precommissioning crew instead of there own personnel
for conducting operations. In the case of an aircraft or
related hardware, OPTEVFOR uses the total in-house concept,
using only their own personnel to test the item.
Operational Test and Evaluation Force is presently






























In this chapter the services' independent test agencies
have been reviewed. Their organizational relationship and
methods of performing OT&E have been highlighted. A summary
of these relationships and methods are provided in Appendix
B.
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V. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE
SERVICES' INDEPENDENT TEST AGENCIES
In response to DoD directives, each service has elected
a different approach in their organizational structure for
performing OTiE. Both the Army and the Air Force chose to
participate much more closely with the Developing Agency
(DA). Both OTEA and AFOTEC are small organizations v.-hich
plan, direct, and control the operational testing, yet they
leave the actual testing to the user cor.imand, normally
utilizing the unit programmed to receive the first opera-
tional system.
The Navy, on the other hand, has elected to use the to-
tal in- house concept in the case of aircraft systems' test-
ing and evaluation. OPTEVFOR acts as a surrogate for the
user by utilizing their ovjn independent test facilities and
assets to conduct tests on the systems. Additionally, OPTEV-
FOR believes that the involvement with the DA will jeopard-
ize their objectivity with the system [Ref. 22].
In trying to answer the question as to whether OPTEVFOR
needs be to restructured, it will be best to address the
advantages and disadvantages of each service's independent
operational test agency.
OPTEVFOR's strongest feature is their insistence on
total independence in order to maintain their objectivity in
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the T(!cE process. Currently, OPTEVFOR insists that in order
to maintain their independence or objectivity, interaction
between OPTEVFOR and the DA has to be kept to a minimum.
Stated another way, the issue is independence versus
cooperation, with OPTEVFOR placing more weight on the side
of independence. [Ref. 22]
It is this independence that is considered their
strength because they do not have to concern themselves with
the developer trying to twist their arm in an attempt to get
a favorable decision. Additionally, by making themselves
the tester and not using the operational commands, they are
able to address the system with more objectivity since they
do not have a vested interest in the system.
OPTEVFOR's insistence on independence is also their big-
gest disadvantage. This reluctance has been the focal point
in numerous studies, such as the the President's Blue Rib-
bon Panel Report (BRDP) in 1970. The BRDP believed that it
is important to perform OTicE on an operationally configured
production system. However, if the OT&E process only com-
mences at OPEVAL, it misses most of the opportunity to in-
fluence the product during its development on behalf of the
operational forces. [Ref. 10: p. 88] The Defense Science
Board on 17 February 1977, published a study stating that
"interaction among development test and evaluation and
operational test and evaluation, in addition to the close
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contact v;ith the users, pays very important: divxdends in
terms of money, time and operational suitability" [Ref. 1:
p. 7]. Both these reports, alon,], with others, indicate
that a working relationship between the DA and the indepen-
dent test agency is critical to the acquisition process.
Since OPTEVFOR does not actively participate in nhe
system, this tends to create the "gotcha" syndrome
[Ref. 25]. V/hen a system comes from TECHSVAL to Oi°EVAL,
there is a possibility that it may not pass due to a change
in OPTEVFOR test criteria. A weapon is developed to meet a
stated operational requirement (OR). This requirement can be
affected by funding reductions, schedule delays and contract
disputes, in addition to changing threats ,new weapons and
new tactics. As a result, the DA develops a system that
fully meets the requirements of the original OR, but as a
result of the aforementioned ongoing changes, it falls
short of the current OTdE criteria. Since OPTEVFOR does
not interface with the developing agency, it is extremely
likely that the DA might not be aware of these changes. The
end result is the system is not ready for OPEVAL due to
test criteria changes. It is at this point that the
"gotcha" takes place.
Another study done in the summer of 198^ by the Maval
Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) further illustrates what
the results can be when there is little or no interface
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b9tv;een OPTEVFOR and the DA. The conirnittee reviewed a
random sample of 142 of OPTEVFOR's OPEVALS that were
conducted between 1975 and 1982. The results of the study
showed that 20% failed OPEVAL outright and ^1 %
conditionally passed. These systems were assessed for their
operational effectiveness and suitability. Of those that
failed, the majority of them failed the suitability aspect
of the test. [Ref. 25] The question which arises here is.
how can a system get this far in the process and then fail?
This is like having a student advance all the way through
the education system and then give this student a literacy
test and find out that the individual is unable to read and
wr i te
.
In the author's opinion, the number of failures in
OPEVAL could be attributed to OPTEVFOR insistence on
maintaining their independence. With increased
communication. OPTEVFOR could alert the development agencies
to the changes in the suitability requirements much earlier
in the acquisition process. This in turn would reduce the
number of failures. By waiting until just before the system
is ready to enter production to communicate, the only
recourse if a discrepancy is discovered is to fail the
system.
On the other side of the spectrum . a strong point of
both the OTEA's and AFOTEC's arrangement is their increased
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ability to conununicate with the DAs. Instead of representing
the user as in the case of OPTKVFOR, botn OTEA and AFOTEC
believe in getting the user involved at a very early stage
in the OT&E process. OTEA uses a central group comprised of
their personnel and the user to test a systein. The Air
Force, on the other hand obtains the personnel needed to
test the system from the user and support commands on either
a Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) or Permanent Change of
Station (PCS) basis. These personnel are then sent to AFOTEC
to support the program.
OTEA has recently implemented a new plan called
Continuous Conception Evaluation (C2E), which has advanced
the idea of continuous independent evaluation through the
program's acquisition cycle. Differing from OTEA's previous
methodology, C2E begins at a much earlier point in tne
acquisition process and follows the system past the
production phase of the process. The data generated from
models, simulations, contractor/government testing, and
operating trials is now being collected and correlated for
future use. This information will help to provide trends,
projections and inputs for existing and future projects.
[Ref. 23: p. 6]. Thru C2E, OTEA is now in essence tracking a
major system from inception to retirement from inventory.
Figure 9 shows the major projects that are currently under
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AFOTEC is similar to OTEA in that it establishes a close
liaison with the DA. The Air Force's new e.riphasis on the
operational requirement of a system has resulted in a even
closer working relationship between AFOTEC and the DAs. The
DA is now continually kept advised of any chan-^^es in the
system's operational requirements by AFOTEC. The obvious
benefit is that there are no surprise OR changes when the
system enters OPEVAL. Additionally, the Air Force, in an
attempt to shorten the acquisition process, is trying to use
DT&E to help verify the operational performance of a system.
A reduction in duplicative testing can be achieved since
some of these tests will not have to be repeated under OTaE.
Presently being used on the B-1 bomber, this approach is
considered a signifj.cant change and is still in the very
early stages of evolution by the Air Force. [Ref. 24: p. 5]
This close working relationship of OTEA and AFOTEC with
the DA and user commands can shorten the acquisition
process. 3y alerting the system to changes and, in the case
of the Air Force, reducing duplicative efforts in testing
the total time required to field a system is reduced.
The underlying reason behind the establishment of the
independent operational test agency (ITA) was to assure the
independence in the testing of a system, riowever, one of
the biggest disadvantages that can result from too close a
working relationship between the ITA and the DA/user command
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is a loss of objectivity. It is very hard to maintain
objectivity when so much time has been spent with the people
developing the system. Botn OTZA and AFOTEC have to contend
with pressures from not only the DA, but also the user,
both of whom are trying to get the system into production.
The DA wants the system to enter production because this
makes him look good. The user wants the hardware since it is
perceived to be better than that which he has presently. As
a result, he wants the system to do well in testing as this
would expedite the fielding of the new system. If the ITAs
bends to their wishes, the result could be a system entering
production that might require extensive after-production
modifications to make it function properly. Any savings in
time and costs v/hich were gained by the ITAs interfacing are
now removed by the additional tiaie and costs required to fix
the system's shortcomings.
In summation, this chapter has illustrated that
OPTEVFOR's strongest point, their insistence on
independence, is also their weakest feature. In their effort
to insure their objectivity, OPTEVFOR has missed the
opportunity to influence the system's developi:ient on behalf
of the operational forces. Additionally, their lack of
cooperation can add to the length of the acquisition
process. By not keeping the DAs appraised of changes in
the OR, it is possible that a system might have to go
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baclc through development to cor^rect the shortcomings
introduced by the new requirements. On the other nand,
OTEA's and AFOTEC's best feature is their strong
relationship with the DA. This relationship can correct
OPTEVFOR's most prevalent shortcomings, however, it in
itself can introduce problems if carried too far. resulting




Before we put a weapon system in the hands of our
troops we should ensure that it performs its combat mis-
sion, not that it simply meets contract specifications.
. . . American service personnel have a right to ex-
pect that the governr.ient will provide them with the
necessary tools to do their job. [Ref. 26: p. 23]
This statement made by Representive C. E. Bennett, is an
excellent summation of V'/hat is expected from OT&E in the ac-
quisition process. The purpose of the independent test
agencies is to determine whether the weapon system fulfills
the desired function in an operational environment.
In the introduction, a statement from the Summer 1984
NRAC report indicated that restructuring would enormously
reduce the size and cost of OPTEVFOR. In addition, the
report stated that the user's inputs could be introduced
into the process on an earlier and continuous basis [Ref. 2].
The first part of this statement is appealing, however the
preceding analysis of operational test agencies indicates
that there is strong reason to believe that changes in
operating policy, not the actual structure of OPTEVFOR,
should be made.
The present manning levels of OTEA and AFOTSC are in ac-
tuality about the same or even greater than OPTEVFOR. This
analysis of the manning levels is based on counting the per-
sonnel that OTEA and AFOTEC utilize from other commands for
support of their testing. By comparing these numbers against
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OPTEVFOR's total complement of officerG, enlisted and
civilians, it becomes evident that the Army and Air Force
OT&E manning effort is not less than the iJavy's. For ex-
ample, AFOTEC ' 3 level of 2500 supporting personnel is al-
most double that of OPTEVFOR total in-house complement of
1300 personnel.
Considering the costs of those services supplied oy the
other supporting commands, it appears that operating costs
of each ITA are cor.iparaole. In essence, there is very
little difference betvv'een the size and cost of each ITA if
the supporting commands for OTEA and AFOTEC are included in
the analysis. The actual cost of each ITA and its supporting
command was beyond the scope of the research for this
thesis, however, the potential value of this information
merits further study.
The statement that the users inputs need to be provided
earlier and on a continuous basis can be viev^ed as a result
of OPTEVFOR's philosophy and not its existing structure. Un-
til recently, OPTEVFOR has been resistant to the idea of
interacting more closely with the DAs, so that it could
maintain objectivity. The importance placed by OPTEVFOR on
maintaining objectivity has changed somewhat witn the new
commanding officer (COMOPTEVFOR). An examination of the
findings of the Summer 1934 ;jRAC reoort reveals a change in
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relationship between OPTEVFOR and the DAs [Ref. 25]. It ap-
pears that the new COMOPTEVFOR endorses increased liaison
with the DAs.
In the past, when a system arrived for the OPEVAL
that did not meet the test criteria it \s;ould immediately
fail. Now, if a problem is discovered, instead of failing
the system outright, COIIOPTEVFOR will call his counterpart
at the DAs and inform him that the system is not doing well.
This allows the DAs to remove the system from OPEVAL and
correct the deficiencies. This new approach not only keeps
the problems in-house and away from the public, but it also
fosters greater cooperation.
This cooperative relationship should not begin just at
the time and point that a system enters OPEVAL. It is not
enough to just advise the DAs that the system is not doing
well and needs some correction. The L'avy needs to strongly
encourage the earJ.y, continuous, and positive participation
of all key players as described in OPNAVINST 3960.10. The
difference between the operational test requirements and
that of development testing mandates closer coordination
between the Navy's independent test agency and its develop-
ing agencies. These organizations need early and clear
definition of the test objectives, criteria and the stand-
ards. Once these conditions can be agreed upon, they must
be kept current throughout the program to minimize the
necessity for repeat development and testing. Failure to do
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30 can result in unnecessary delays and higher costs in the
acquisition of fleet-ready weapon systems.
Another area outside the scope of this research is the
cost associated with having to send a systen back through a
part of the acquisition process because it fails OPEVAL.
There are undoubtedly increased costs, however the magnitude
of this problem was not pursued. This subject has potential
value in determining the real efficiency of the OTjcS effort
and merits further investigation.
A loss of independence in operational test is not being
advocated nor is inference being raade that objectivity is
not important. The real key to effective and efficient OTaE
is meaningful communication among the participants in the
acquisition process. If the test requirements are
coordinated and discussed by all parties, then conflict may
be reduced to minor proportions or eliminated altogether.
OPTEVFOR should not change its existing structural
arrangement, since it been has demonstrated that tnis was
not where the problem exists. Instead. OPTEVFOR needs to
expound upon the new movement of increased communication
v;ith the DAs. The end result of this increased
communication will be a vastly improved independent test
agency that may ameliorate the potential of an inadequate
system reaching the fleet. The IJavy can neither afford
57
the development of systems that do not meet the fleets
needs, nor can they afford the publicity that results in a
produced system that fails in the fleet.






















Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation
Center
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DCSRDA Deputy Chief of Staff Research Development and
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DDR&E Director of Defense Research and Engineering
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DoD Department of Defense
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GAO Government Accounting Office
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APPENDIX B ARMY/NAVY/ AIR FORCE COMPARISON
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usually phased as DT
I. II, and III and
OT I, II, and III.
Usually OT I is run
in combination with
DT I. Army attempts
to keep OT II and
III and DT II and
III separated.
c. Each phase of OT
testing results in a
separate evaluation
by OTEA, timed to
provide evaluation
to to the decision
body (JRMB) at deci-
sion milestones.
d . DT II , OT II .
and DT III are con-
ducted on all
development items/


















































e. DC? (OTiE inputs
provided by OTEA)

















f . Test objectives
annex to the PMD




























of all DT and OT
testing of the
system)













d. DCP (OT^^E inputsprovided by
OPTEVFOR)
e. Test and Evalua-
tion Master Plan
(TEMP)- (contains
DTScE and OT^cE plans
for a specific
program
f. Project ii aster











































1 2 . Command s per-
forming evaluation
of OT&E directed by
Service HQ:
The command conduct-
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